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BEYOND BLOOD QUANTUM 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING TRIBAL 
ENROLLMENT 
 
Tommy Miller∗ 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Tribal nations take many different approaches to citizenship. Many tribes 
require their members to have a certain blood percentage, or blood quantum.  
Some require that blood quantum match the specific tribe,1 while others simply 
require a blood quantum of Indian descent.2 Membership determinations in other 
tribes is based on lineal descent,3 or matrilineal or patrilineal descent.4 However, 
membership in a tribe does not by itself ensure full and equal rights. In the 
Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, for example, there are no blood quantum 
requirements for membership, but the Chief, Assistant Chief, and Members of the 
Tribal Council must be at least one-quarter Choctaw.5 History provides a unique 
lens through which to view the rise and current use of blood quantum 
requirements for tribal membership. 
 Blood quantum laws were first used in the United States to prevent mixed 
race people from holding public office or intermarrying with Europeans.6 In 1817, 
the federal government began using blood quantum in treaties to separate “half-
∗ * Tommy Miller is a 2015 J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School and a member of the Colville 
Confederated Tribes. He would like to thank his family for their constant support and inspiration, 
Professor Joe Singer for his guidance, and the staff of the American Indian Law Journal for their 
hard work.  
1 See, e.g., HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE CONST. ART. IV (2012)  
2 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, ART. II; See also 
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian 
Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1123, 1139-45 (1994). 
3 See, e.g., CHOCTAW NATION CONST., ART. VI, § 2 (1838) available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/choctaw-msldigital/assets/325/1838constitution_original.pdf. 
4 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54 (1978). 
5 See, e.g., CHOCTAW NATION CONST., ART. VI, VII. 
6 Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 
1, 5. 
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breeds” from those with a lower blood quantum, conferring benefits only on the 
former.7 These early treaties did not speak of blood quantum in terms of tribal 
membership, but rather as a criterion to determine eligibility for specific benefits.8 
At least as early as 1847, however, treaties reflected that people of mixed blood 
were members of the Indian tribes the government was dealing with.9 Through 
much of its history, however, the United States used a rule of patrilineal descent to 
describe who it would recognize as Indian,10 with a gradual shift to deference to 
tribal definitions of membership.11 
Blood quantum started to become more relevant during the Allotment Era. 
During that era the federal government’s goal was to dissolve reservations and 
apportion the reservation lands among tribal members in the form of 
“allotments”.12 As part of the guardian-ward responsibilities the United States 
believed it had with Indians, it placed restrictions on alienation of the allotments it 
created from reservation lands.13 The restriction was originally to last for 25 years 
from the granting of the allotment. When that failed to free up the land quickly 
enough, Congress passed a statute allowing Indians that were deemed 
“competent” by federal officials to sell their parcels immediately.14 To expedite the 
allotment and division process, Congress began to use blood quantum and race 
as proxies for competency, particularly for the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma.15 
At one end of the spectrum were whites and freedmen who had been incorporated 
into the tribe, referred to as “Indians who are not of Indian blood,”16 and at the 
other were full blood Indians.17 The less Indian blood an individual possessed, the 
sooner he could alienate his interests in the land, and the fewer restrictions he was 
under generally.18 
As tribes gained autonomy, many included blood quantum as a prerequisite 
for membership. Under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, many tribes 
7 Id. at 10. 
8 Id. at 11. 
9 Id. at 12; TREATY WITH THE CHIPPEWA ART. 4, Aug. 2, 1847, 9 Stat. 904, 905. 
10 See generally Spruhan, supra, note 6. 
11 Id. at 29-30. 
12 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2012). 
13 See General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 389, ch. 119, 25 USCA 331 
(1887) [hereinafter Dawes Act]; See also, Spruhan, supra note 6, at 40. 
14 Act of May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 182, 183, ch. 2348 (1906); Spruhan, supra note 6, at 40. 
15 Spruhan, supra note 6, at 40-41. 
16 See Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 189, 204, ch. 1402 (1904); Spruhan, supra note 6, at 41. 
17 Spruhan, supra note 6, at 41. 
18 Id.  
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adopted constitutions that included blood quantum at the urging of the Department 
of the Interior.19 Elimination of these blood quantum requirements would require 
approval by the Secretary of the Interior.20 However, the Department itself has 
advocated for the removal of this review requirement, on the grounds that it 
violates tribal self determination.21 Additionally, many tribal constitutions also 
contain express provisions that require federal approval before they can change 
membership criteria.22 Despite the formal support of the Department for self-
determination, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) seems to remain hostile to the 
idea of opening up membership.23 Accordingly, some of the potential changes to 
membership requirements presented by this article may be difficult to implement, 
even with strong tribal support. Since 1975, tribes have moved towards self-
determination. Part of this movement has been the revision of constitutions drafted 
by the federal government, to bring them in line with the values, traditions, and 
goals of the tribe.24 One of the major stumbling blocks in this process of 
constitutional reform is how the tribe will define its membership.25 Above all, tribes 
must design membership, and other institutions to reflect their unique tribal culture. 
This paper seeks to facilitate the reform process by laying out some of the legal 
and policy implications of various kinds of citizenship criteria, to add to legal and 
tribal conversations about reform. Section I explores the legality of tribes 
incorporating non-Indians as members; Section II examines the legal effects of 
non-Indian enrollment in various areas of Federal Indian Law; and Section III looks 
at the policy implications of adopting different kinds of membership criteria. 
II. THE LEGALITY OF TRIBES ENROLLING NON-INDIANS AS TRIBAL MEMBERS 
19 Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 437, 446-447 (2002). 
20 Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent 
Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 255-57 (2009). 
21 S. Rep. No. 100-577 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3925 (comments of Ross Swimmer, 
Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior). 
22 See, e.g., CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION CONST., 
art. II, § 3 (“Future membership may be regulated from time to time by ordinance of the 
Confederated Tribes subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior.”) available at 
http://www.cskt.org/gov/docs/cskt_constitutionbylaws.pdf, (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
23 See Goldberg, supra, note 19, at 448-449 (citing Thomas v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 2d 
1185, 1192 (W.D. Wis. 2001)). 
24 See AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS, 2 (Eric 
Lamont ed., 2006). 
25 See Goldberg, supra, note 19 at 437. 
325
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
In order for tribes to create membership criteria that are independent of blood 
quantum it must be constitutional for tribes to include non-Indians as members, 
and it must be within tribal inherent authority to recognize the non-Indians as such. 
While there seem to be no cases directly testing either proposition, it seems from 
the weight of the authority that it would be both constitutional and within the 
inherent powers of tribes to adopt non-Indians as members. 
 
A. The Constitutionality of Non-Members Being Tribal Members 
It is likely constitutional for tribes to enroll non-Indians as tribal members. 
Although some old Supreme Court cases suggest that there is an Indian lineage 
requirement for tribal enrollment, the principles of Indian law and historical practice 
indicate the opposite. Constitutional federal authority over Indian affairs derives 
from the commerce clause, the treaty clause, and the necessary and proper 
clause.26 These clauses have been interpreted broadly to give the federal 
government “plenary” authority over Indian affairs.27 Historically, Congress and the 
Executive branch have had primary authority in recognizing Indians and Indian 
Tribes, with the Supreme Court giving deference to the decisions of the other 
branches.28 After the Civil War, the political branches forced some tribes that 
previously held slaves to adopt the former slaves as tribal members.29 Although 
there have not been any Supreme Court challenges to this scheme of non-Indian 
tribal membership, the longstanding historical practice and broad deference given 
to the political branches mean that this scheme is likely constitutional.30 The 
following cases suggest the opposite, but only in unpersuasive dicta. 
In United States v. Rogers, the Supreme Court decided that a White man 
who had been adopted by the Cherokee Tribe was not subject to an exemption to 
26 COHEN, supra note 12, at § 5.01. 
27 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) (quoting United States v. Holliday, 
70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865)) (“In reference to all matters of this kind, it is the rule of this court to follow 
the action of the executive and other political departments of the government, whose more special 
duty it is to determine such affairs. If by them Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must do 
the same.”). 
29 See, e.g., Treaty with the Seminole Nation, 1866, art. 2, 14 Stat. 756; Treaty with the Cherokee, 
1866, art. 9, 14 Stat. 799. 
30 Several Supreme Court cases rely on historical practice to determine the validity of federal 
action. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Thus, the longstanding 
recognition of these non-Indian “freedmen” as tribal members would likely influence a decision 
about the validity of that enrollment scheme. 
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federal criminal jurisdiction that applied only to “Indian[s].”31 Rogers was a White 
man who had been moved to Cherokee country, made his home there, married a 
Cherokee woman, had several children, and had no “intention of returning to the 
United States.”32 Furthermore, the Cherokee Tribe had adopted Rogers, and 
treated him as a Cherokee, with the full privileges of membership.33 In order to 
combat lawlessness, Congress had extended federal criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian Country, but left an exemption for “crimes committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian,” over which tribes retained exclusive 
jurisdiction.34 The Court in Rogers wrote that “a white man who at mature age is 
adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian, and was not 
intended to be embraced in the exception above mentioned.”35Although this 
language appears strong, the holding itself is simply that Rogers remains subject 
to federal jurisdiction; his adoption was not enough to sever his ties and 
responsibilities to the United States.36 Additionally, the Court, interpreting 
Congress’ intent, wrote that the exception “does not speak of members of a tribe, 
but of the race generally,-of the family of Indians,” in an effort to preserve intra- 
and inter-tribal autonomy over Indians.37 The Court read the racial requirement 
into the statute based on presumptive congressional intent regarding crime in 
Indian Country.38 There is  no indication that tribes lack the general ability to 
naturalize non-Indians, or make them members of tribes, just that tribes lack the 
specific power to bring non-Indians under the exception to criminal jurisdiction, 
because “Indian” in that statute is a purely racial term. 
In Montoya v. United States, the court held that Victoria’s Band, which had 
attacked settlers, constituted a distinct band that was not in amity with the United 
States, and therefore the settlers were not entitled to remuneration under a federal 
statute.39 The Court defined an Indian tribe as “a body of Indians of the same or a 
similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and 
31 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846). 
32 Id. at 568. 
33 Id. at 568. 
34 Id. at 572. 
35 Id. at 572-73. 
36 Id. at 573-74. 
37 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573 (“[the exception] intended to leave them both, as regarded their own 
tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs.”) 
38 Id. at 573 (The court’s reasoning also relies on the fact that it would be against congressional 
intent to extend the exception to Rogers, as that would invite the criminally inclined to settle among 
the Indians, and would frustrate Congress’ goal of preserving peace.) 
39 Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901). 
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inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory” and a “band” as “a 
company of Indians not necessarily, though often, of the same race or tribe, but 
united under the same leadership in a common design.”40 It also says that “tribe” 
implies a separate racial origin.41 The Court’s purpose in creating this definition, 
however, was not to limit the definition of a tribe to members of the same race, but 
to distinguish a band from a tribe for the purposes of designating a specific band 
as distinct from the tribes to which its members were racially linked. Any 
requirement that tribes be composed of members of the same race was dicta. The 
court offers absolutely no reasoning to support including ancestry as a prerequisite 
to tribal membership. The only reasoning that could be inferred to support the 
inclusion of the racial requirement is that the court believes Indians are too inferior 
to organize on a permanent basis unless connected by race,42 which is both racist 
and inaccurate. As the racial requirement for tribal membership was not relevant to 
the holding of the case, and unsupported by reasoning, it should not be 
considered evidence that tribes lack the ability to adopt non-Indians. 
Like Montoya, there is language in United States v. Sandoval to suggest 
that race is a requirement for tribal membership. Sandoval involved the trafficking 
of alcohol in Indian country, which was a federal crime.43 The question was 
whether Congress validly designated the Pueblo land as Indian Country, that is, 
whether the Congress could validly consider the Pueblos to be Indians and govern 
them with special laws.44 The court held that as long as a community was distinctly 
Indian, Congress could deal with them as a tribe for as long as it wanted, which 
included the Pueblo.45 Although Congress could not arbitrarily assert that a group 
of people were “Indians” for the purpose of governing them separately, the 
designation was not arbitrary for the Pueblo, considering their “Indian lineage, 
isolated and communal life, primitive customs and limited civilization.”46 Although 
this list was sufficient to justify congressional action in that case, there is no 
indication that all, or even any, of the factors on the list are necessary to recognize 
a group as a tribe. In other words, the court does not hold that Indian lineage is a 
40 Id. at 266. 
41 Id. at 266. 
42 See Id. at 265 (discussing the aspects of Indians’ characters that make it impossible for them to 
form a true “nation”). See also Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and tribal 
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1072-1073 (2012) (providing a historical context for the 
court’s rhetoric). 
43 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 36 (1913). 
44 See Id. at 38. 
45 See Id. at 46-49. 
46 See Id. at 46-47. 
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constitutional requirement for federal recognition of a tribe, or those tribes would 
be unable to enroll non-Indians. 
A central theme in the dicta of these cases is the association of “Indian” 
status with race. These cases were the products of a different era in United States 
history, however, and conceptions of race and the appropriate role it should play in 
legal decisions has changed dramatically.  In the area of Federal Indian Law in 
particular, the Supreme Court has determined that “Indian” is a political term, 
rather than a racial one.47 Accordingly, the race-based reasoning of these cases is 
no longer valid.  Although there remains a descent component,48 current federal 
recognition requirements emphasize political existence of tribes.49 Additionally, the 
descent aspect is not explicitly racial, but requires members of a tribe seeking 
recognition to “descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes 
which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity.”50 To the 
extent that this regulation attempts to place a limitation based on race rather than 
political affiliation on tribal membership, it would likely trigger equal protection 
concerns explored in Section II of this paper. 
Overall, the enrollment of non-Indians in tribes is likely constitutional, and is 
supported by historical actions of both tribes and the political branches of the 
federal government. 
B. The Inherent Ability of Tribes to Adopt Non-Indians as Members 
 It is an established principle of Indian law that Indian tribes possess 
“inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”51 A 
corollary of this principle is that tribes retain all of their sovereign powers except 
those “withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status.”52 Indian tribes likely possess the ability to recognize 
someone as a tribal member for the purposes of granting them rights and 
47 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
48 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (f) (2014). 
49 See, e.g., Id at (b) (the group must comprise a distinct community that traces its roots to 
historical times); Id at (c) (The group has maintained political control over its members since 
historical times). 
50 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (e) (2014). 
51 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978). See also COHEN, supra note 12, at § 
4.01[1][a]. 
52  Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). See also COHEN, supra note 12, at § 4.01[1][a]. 
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privileges of citizenship,53 but whether or not they may be recognized for more 
general purposes, such as receiving federal benefits, is less clear.54 The ability of 
tribes to control their membership has been recognized as an important element of 
tribal sovereignty.55 Therefore, tribes likely still retain the ability to recognize non-
Indians as tribal members. 
 It is unlikely that tribes have been implicitly divested of the power to enroll 
non-Indians. The Supreme Court first articulated the principle of implicit divestiture 
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 56 There, the Court noted that tribes had 
already lost the ability to freely alienate their lands and form political connections 
with foreign powers.57 Post-Oliphant, the implicit divestiture doctrine has been 
applied to other forms of jurisdiction as well,58 although the rationale behind the 
theory is unclear.59 Oliphant itself seems to suggest that tribal powers are only 
implicitly divested when they come into conflict with the interests of the United 
States, which has “overriding sovereignty.”60 In Montana v. United States, 
however, the Court held that tribes lost the power to regulate non-member hunting 
and fishing activity on reservations not because it conflicted with federal authority 
or interests, but because tribes had lost that power as a result of their “dependent” 
status.61 The Supreme Court has not yet directly decided whether tribes can enroll 
non-Indians as members for general purposes such as receiving federal benefits, 
although the principles of implicit divestiture and federal Indian law generally 
suggest that tribes have not been divested of this power.62  
 Tribal enrollment of non-Indians does not seem overly in conflict with the 
interests of the United States. Unlike in Oliphant, where the federal government 
53 See Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897). 
54 See infra Section II. (a discussion of potential treatment of non-Indian tribal members under 
various areas of law.) 
55 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
56 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
57 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 
U.S. 543 (1823) and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)). 
58 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
59 COHEN, supra note 12, at § 4.02[3][a]. 
60 Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 at 209.  
61 See Montana, 450 U.S. 544 at 564; See also COHEN, supra note 12, at § 4.02[3][a]. 
62 See infra Section III. (Status as a tribal member or an Indian is used in different ways in different 
areas of federal statutory and common law, and the inability to adopt non-Indians for one purpose 
does not foreclose adoption for another purpose). United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846). 
(Tribes cannot exempt non-Indians from federal jurisdiction by enrolling them as members under a 
particular statute, but that does not mean that Indian tribes are similarly limited in other areas). 
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had legislated in the area of criminal jurisdiction and therefore expressed its 
interests clearly,63 Congress has made no indication that tribes should not be 
enrolling non-Indians.  Indeed, to the contrary, Congress and the President have 
demanded that certain tribes enroll non-Indian former slaves as members.64 On 
the other hand, massive increases in tribal membership would increase the burden 
on the federal government to provide certain services, like healthcare, to Indians. 
Since these programs are generally underfunded, it is not clear that the addition of 
more tribal members would by itself result in any actual increased financial or 
other burden for the federal government. If the “overriding interests” version of the 
implicit divestiture test is applied to determine the scope of the tribal power, it 
seems like the tribe will be held to have the power. Later sections of this paper 
address some of these concerns. 
 It is also unlikely that this power to expand membership has been lost as a 
result of the status of tribes as a result of their dependent status. In Roff v. Burney, 
the Supreme Court recognized the broad power of tribes to control their 
membership decisions, including with regards to non-Indians.65 Indeed, in 
Montana the court recognized a difference between powers necessary to self-
government and internal relations and decisions affecting outside groups, and 
specifically reaffirmed tribal control over membership determinations.66 Once 
again, the ability to enroll tribal members who would then receive federal benefits 
is unclear, but the enrollment of non-Indians would only directly increase the 
number of people vying for a piece of the existing pie, and would not force the 
federal government to increase appropriations. Accordingly, because there is no 
conflict between tribal and federal interests, tribes likely have not lost the power to 
expand membership as a result of their dependent status. 
II. LEGAL IMPACTS OF ENROLLING NON-INDIANS 
 Non-Indians enrolling as tribal members would have implications for many 
areas of federal Indian law, and would change the constitutional legal analysis for 
some established legal doctrines. In the following examination, I will assume that 
the adoption law that is followed would allow non-Indians to become full tribal 
63 Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 at 203.  
64 See supra Section I.A. 
65 Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897). (The disenrollment of a White man was acceptable, but did 
not rule directly on the acceptability of his original adoption.) 
66 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981), (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 322 n. 18 (1978)). 
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members, as opposed to tiered membership as discussed in Section III. The court 
in Morton v. Mancari held that distinctions based on status as an Indian were 
“political” rather than “racial” distinctions,67 so anything less than full tribal 
citizenship might be considered another level of political classification, and may 
not trigger the equal protection analysis that I describe for certain laws. Parts A, B, 
and C will examine the impact of non-Indian enrollment on federal, tribal, and state 
criminal jurisdiction, respectively. Parts D and E will examine the minor effect on 
tribal and state civil jurisdiction, while Part F will explore the impact on federal 
statutory benefits. 
A. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country is governed by the General 
Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act.68 The General Crimes Act applies only to 
interracial crimes between Indians and non-Indians within Indian Country,69 while 
the Major Crimes Act applies to any “major” crimes committed by Indians in Indian 
Country.70 
In order to count as “Indian” for the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, 
a defendant must be shown to have some degree of Indian blood, and be 
recognized as Indian by a federally recognized tribe, although this does not always 
require membership in the tribe.71 The requirement of “some Indian blood”72 
comes from the case United States v. Rogers, in which a White man adopted by 
the Cherokee was held to not be an Indian for the purposes of federal criminal 
jurisdiction.73 That case involved the Indian-against-Indian exception to the 
General Crimes Act, and held that Rogers was not subject to the exemption 
67 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
68 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 9.02. 
69 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2014). Cohen, supra note 12, at § 9.02[1]. (Indian-on-Indian crime is 
exempted from the General Crimes Act by the statute itself, and the Supreme Court has held that 
non-Indian-on-non-Indian crime within Indian Country is subject to state jurisdiction). United States 
v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882). 
70 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2014). 
71 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 9.02[1][d]. 
72 See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. 
REV. 1041, 1086-87 (2012). The Supreme Court has never stated how much Indian blood is 
required, and lower courts have come to various conclusions. Id. Courts have adopted amorphous 
requirements ranging from “some” to “substantial.” Id. Because the amount of Indian blood required 
does not affect the equal protection analysis, this paper will use the “some” standard when referring 
to the requirement. 
73 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846). 
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because he was White.74 This case, however, was decided before the ratification 
of the 14th Amendment and the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, 
and this rule may no longer be good law. Now, the requirement of “some Indian 
blood” could be an impermissible racial classification foreclosed by Morton v. 
Mancari.75 
After Morton, federal laws targeting Indians are generally understood as 
being political, rather than racial classifications, and are therefore not subject to 
the strict scrutiny applied to classifications based on race.76 However, tribal 
members are still subject to the protections of the 14th Amendment, such as 
protections from racial discrimination.77 Therefore, if non-Indians could be enrolled 
as members, the blood requirements for both the General Crimes Act and the 
Major Crimes Act would be suspect, because they would create different 
outcomes based solely on race. For instance, under the General Crimes Act, a 
non-Indian tribal member defendant who committed a crime against an Indian in 
Indian Country (e.g. Rogers) could argue that he should be subject to the 
exemption for Indian-on-Indian crime, and not be subject to federal prosecution. 
Since a similarly situated person of Indian descent would be exempt, and the only 
difference is his ancestry, this is a compelling claim. 
Additionally, the requirement of Indian blood in the Major Crimes Act could 
be challenged by an Indian prosecuted in federal court under the act. In United 
States v. Antelope, the Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge brought by a 
Coeur D’Alene tribal member who argued that his federal prosecution violated 
equal protection because it subjected him to the federal felony murder rule, while a 
non-Indian would have been subject to Idaho law, which had rejected the felony 
murder rule. 78 The court held that the distinction was based on the tribal 
member’s political affiliation with a federally recognized tribe, rather than a racial 
distinction, and was therefore constitutional.79 The court did not address the fact 
that a similarly situated non-Indian tribal member would presumably have been 
74 Id.  
75 Mancari, 417 U.S. 535. 
76 Id.  But see COHEN, supra note 12, at § 14.03[2][b] (arguing that Morton is about fulfilling the 
“unique obligations toward the Indians,” rather than a political/racial distinction). 
77 See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-
Wisconsin, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Wis. 1992); COHEN, supra note 12, at § 14. 
78 United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
79 430 U.S. at 645. 
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exempt from federal prosecution, simply by virtue of his ancestry. Had this issue 
been considered, the court might have found an equal protection violation. 
An equal protection challenge framed in either of these ways would likely 
result in the end of the “some Indian blood” requirement. The requirement does 
not appear on the face of either statute, and was added as a gloss on the General 
Crimes Act by the court in Rogers, based on presumed congressional intent.80 
Since Rogers was before the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, the 
court did not have to deal with the equal protection clause in construing 
congressional intent. Under the modern constitutional avoidance canon, this 
requirement would raise a constitutional question; a reasonable interpretation that 
avoids the question should be adopted before the constitutionality question is even 
reached.81 The Major Crimes Act was first passed in 1885,82 after the ratification of 
the 14th Amendment, so it should be easy for the court to say that the blood 
requirement does not apply to that Act, unless there is overwhelming evidence of 
congressional intent to the contrary. The General Crimes Act, however, is 
somewhat more complicated. The current statute was passed in 1948,83 but the 
law itself has not been substantively changed since 1854,84 before the passage of 
the 14th Amendment in 1868. Additionally, the relevant parts of the law (the 
exceptions to federal jurisdiction) are the same as they were in Rogers, when the 
gloss was added. The Court could therefore presume that congress intended the 
subsequent versions of the act to incorporate the requirement that the Court 
added in Rogers. This presumption, however, likely does not rise to the level of 
clear congressional intent required to overcome the constitutional avoidance 
canon, and the word “Indian” in the statute would likely be interpreted to require 
only tribal affiliation. As a result, it is likely that any non-Indians enrolled as tribal 
members would be treated as “Indians” for the purpose of federal criminal 
jurisdiction. 
B. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
80 Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573. 
81 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”). 
82 82 Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, Stat. 362 (1885).  
83 83 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 6, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (1948). 
84 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 9.02[1][a]. 
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Tribes retain the inherent authority to prosecute tribal members in their 
tribal courts.85 Accordingly, non-Indians who become tribal members would be 
automatically subject to tribal jurisdiction. Additionally, opening up tribal 
membership to non-Indians would make it more likely that the Supreme Court 
would uphold expansions of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member 
Indians, such as the Violence Against Women Act amendment, or the Duro fix. 
The ability of non-member Indians to enroll in a tribe would increase the 
likelihood that the Duro fix, subjecting non-member-Indians to tribal jurisdiction, 
would survive judicial scrutiny. In Oliphant v. Suquamish, the Supreme Court held 
that tribes lacked inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians.86 In Duro v. Reina, the 
Court extended this holding to say that tribes could not exercise jurisdiction over 
non-member Indians.87 In response, congress passed “Duro-fix” legislation, which 
recognized the “inherent power” of tribes to prosecute non-member Indians.88 This 
recognition of tribal authority was upheld in Lara, a double jeopardy case where 
the defendant was being tried in federal court for a crime that he had already been 
convicted of in tribal court.89 However, Lara’s challenge was narrowly constrained 
to the issue of whether tribal prosecution was a delegation of federal power or 
recognition of inherent tribal power, and whether the recognition of tribal power is 
valid.90 Importantly, Lara did not address the due process or equal protection 
problems that might arise from prosecuting a non-member in tribal court.91 
Because the Court determined that those challenges related to the original tribal 
conviction, and not this subsequent federal prosecution, those challenges were left 
for another day. These are not frivolous challenges, as the court may not be 
inclined to uphold a tribal prosecution of a non-member. Justice Kennedy, in 
particular, who concurred with the result in Lara, was very concerned with 
subjecting non-members to tribal jurisdiction.92 Of the justices who remain on the 
court, only Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg signed the majority opinion that 
said congress could and did recognize the tribe’s inherent authority. Justice Scalia 
and Justice Thomas both expressed concerns about the power of congress even 
85 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
86 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
87 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
88 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2014). 
89 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 207-09.  
92 Id. at 211-14.(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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to delegate this authority,93 and seem inclined to vote against further expansion of 
tribal authority. 
The constitutional basis for invalidating the Duro fix is unclear. In terms of 
equal protection, the Duro fix is based on membership in a federally recognized 
tribe, which seems to place Duro-esque prosecutions clearly on the political side of 
the political, racial Mancari divide. As a result, equal protection claims are unlikely 
to succeed.94 For due process, Indian tribal courts are required to comply with the 
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), but ICRA does not encompass the same range of 
protections as the Bill of Rights. Notably, the right to counsel for indigent 
defendants is not present in ICRA.95 This could lead to a successful due process 
claim being brought against a tribal prosecution, although, since the tribe would be 
prosecuting as a separate sovereign not subject to the Constitution, the real issue 
might lie with Congress’ decision to recognize this tribal sovereign power at all. 
The Violence Against Women Act amendment, which subjects non-Indians to 
prosecution in tribal court in limited circumstances, does require tribes to provide 
full constitutional protections to defendants, which should alleviate any due 
process concerns, especially since those protections can be enforced in federal 
court through a habeas petition.96 
Justice Kennedy suggests it is unconstitutional to subject non-members to 
tribal prosecution; as such prosecutions violate the principle of consent of the 
governed.97 Professor Fletcher frames the unease that Justice Kennedy and some 
scholars have with tribal court jurisdiction as a problem with “democratic deficit.”98 
Under this theory, nonmembers should not be subject to tribal jurisdiction because 
93 Id. at 216-17, 231 fn. 3 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring, and Souter, J. dissenting, which Scalia 
joined.) 
94 See Means v. Navajo Nation 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that tribal prosecution of non-
member did not violate equal protection). 
95 25 U.S.C. § 1301 20130. 
96 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/tribal/violence-against-women-act-vawa-reauthorization-2013-0. 
97 Lara, 541 U.S. at 213-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) However, he also answers this contention 
with regard to Lara and similarly situated Indians, because they could avoid tribal prosecutions by 
simply renouncing their tribal citizenship; Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because this does 
mostly answer Kennedy’s concern with regard to non-member Indians, it seems like Kennedy’s real 
concern might be with expansions of tribal criminal jurisdiction to non-Indians, who would have no 
such means of escape. But see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (Kennedy writing that 
tribal membership was not consent to criminal jurisdiction by other tribes). 
98 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 295 ,319 
(2011). 
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they “cannot and could not ever have participated in the political processes that 
created the tribal laws and regulations at issue.”99 Regardless of the questionable 
merit of this argument,100 by expanding tribal membership and removing or 
changing the blood quantum requirement, non-members and non-Indians would 
find themselves able to eventually become tribal members and even if they did not 
take advantage of that opportunity, the potential for participation would remove this 
“democratic deficit.” The impact of opening up membership, then, would seem to 
go beyond expanding jurisdiction to those that join the tribe, and make 
constitutional the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a much larger portion of the 
populace. 
C. State Criminal Jurisdiction 
Like its federal counterpart, state jurisdiction in Indian country usually 
depends on the Indian status of the defendant. If both the defendant and the victim 
are non-Indians then the state has jurisdiction.101 Otherwise, in most cases, the 
General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act preclude state prosecutions.102 
Because the same statutes apply, the same equal protection analysis from that 
section also applies, and non-Indian tribal members would likely be treated the 
same as Indian tribal members for the purposes of state criminal jurisdiction.103 In 
cases where the state has jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country by virtue of 
Public Law 280,104 or some other statute, the state would logically have the same 
amount of jurisdiction over new tribal members as it had over tribal members 
before, whatever that jurisdiction may be.105 
D. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction 
99 Id. 
100 This kind of argument is not given much force in other contexts. For instance, travelling to 
another state subjects a citizen to the laws of that state, regardless of the lack of meaningful 
opportunity to vote in the elections of that state unless the citizen changes residency. The real 
motivation for this argument may then be a discomfort with Tribal justice systems generally, which 
would still be somewhat alleviated by allowing non-members to potentially join. 
101 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882). 
102 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 9.03[1] (citing United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 
(1978) (for preclusion by Major Crimes Act) and Williams v. United States, 327 U.D. 711, 714 
(1946) (for preclusion of interracial crimes)). 
103 See Section II.A, supra. 
104 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360, 1360 note). 
105 For a discussion of the various implications of Public Law 280 in different jurisdictions, see 
COHEN, supra, note 12 at § 6.04[3]. 
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Like tribal criminal jurisdiction, allowing non-Indians to become members 
would have a number of benefits for tribal communities. Tribes generally have 
broad civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over members,106 so new 
members would be subject to that same authority. Additionally, there are two ways 
allowing non-Indians to become members could potentially expand jurisdiction 
even to non-Indians who do not become members. 
First, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation suggests that by consolidating the ownership of land the tribe could regain 
the ability to exclude from a majority of the land and therefore also exercise 
greater jurisdiction over the whole area, particularly for zoning purposes.107 
However, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley dramatically limited Brendale, such 
that it only applies when the non-Indian fee land is “closed,” and development 
would place the entire area in jeopardy.108 As a result, this approach would be 
unlikely to expand tribal jurisdiction greatly. 
 The second approach deals with the same “democratic deficit” problem that 
exists for tribal criminal jurisdiction,109 that is, the idea that non-members should 
not be subject to tribal laws that they can never play a role in creating. For the 
same reasons identified in Section II.B, by making it possible for non-Indians to 
enroll in tribes, jurisdiction might theoretically extend to all those that could 
potentially join the tribe, because they would no longer be necessarily excluded 
from tribal decision-making. However, tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members is 
currently governed by the Montana test and its exceptions.110 Montana says that 
tribes generally lack jurisdiction over non-member on non-member owned fee 
lands within the reservation, except for those non-members who enter consensual 
business relationships with the tribe or its members, or where such jurisdiction 
would be necessary to protect “the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.”111 Accordingly, merely opening up membership 
would not be enough to expand jurisdiction to all non-member activities on a 
reservation, although including more members would increase the sweep of the 
106 Id. at § 4.01. 
107 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 
433-443 (1989). 
108 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 658 (2001). 
109 Section II.B, supra. 
110 See Montana v. U. S., 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
111 See Id. at 565-66; See also, Shirley, 532 U.S. at 657 (applying the Montana test). 
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first Montana exception, as any activity that involves tribal members satisfies the 
exception. 
E. State Civil Jurisdiction 
States generally have limited civil jurisdiction over Indians in Indian 
Country,112 and by enrolling in tribes, non-Indians would be able to avoid some 
forms of state jurisdiction. In particular, some forms of taxation would likely be 
barred by on-reservation non-Indians enrolling in a tribe.113 Non-Indians who 
enrolled would still have to pay ad valorem taxes on fee land they owned on the 
reservation,114 but they would likely be free from paying personal property 
taxes.115 Additionally, these new tribal members would not have to pay taxes for 
activities or income earned on the reservation.116 This would provide an incentive 
for non-members to enroll in a tribe if they lived on the reservation. 
F. Statutory Benefits 
Most statutory benefits and services are based on membership in a 
federally recognized tribe, instead of Indian ancestry.117 Fletcher attributes this 
deference to Indian membership determinations partially to the Supreme Court’s 
race jurisprudence.118 Some programs, like the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
employment preference, used to require a certain blood quantum in addition to 
112 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 6.03[1][a]. 
113 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995) (“But when a State attempts 
to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-
Indians, we have employed, instead of a balancing inquiry, “a more categorical approach: ‘[A]bsent 
cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,’ we have held, a State is without power 
to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.””) (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251(1992)). 
114 See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) (holding that 
by making the land alienable Congress intended to allow state taxation of the land regardless of 
ownership by the Tribe). 
115 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
116 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at § 8.03[1][b]. 
117 Fletcher, supra note 101, at 302.  See also Krakoff, supra note 42, at 1084-1085. Some 
programs, however, extend to Indians who are not members of federally recognized tribes. 
Cohen’s handbook on Federal Indian Law suggests that these can be reconciled with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence by understanding  Morton v. Mancari as requiring that Indian-specific programs 
fulfill Congress’ “unique obligations towards the Indians.”  See also, COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 12, at § 14.03[2][b] (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555). It has also been argued that the 
racial/political distinction that Mancari has been held to stand for is a false dichotomy, and that 
apparently “racial” classifications involving Indians are also political. See Krakoff, supra note 42. 
118 Fletcher, supra note 101, at 303. 
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membership in a federally recognized tribe, but in the wake of Morton v. Mancari 
those requirements have been dropped.119 As a result, it appears that non-Indian 
tribal members would be eligible for the full range of services that Indian tribal 
members are eligible for, and they would be treated as Indian for other purposes 
such as Indian Child Welfare Act protections. As discussed in Section III, however, 
if tribes begin separating membership from rights, and creating tiered citizenship, 
the federal government may rework its benefits criteria. 
III. EVALUATING MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA 
There are many alternatives available for expanding tribal enrollment, each 
with its own costs and benefits. The ideal membership requirements will depend 
on the tribe and tribal values at issue, but Professor Carole Goldberg presents a 
useful framework for thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of various 
alternative criteria for membership.120 This paper emulates that approach by 
beginning with the goals and considerations for tribal membership, and then 
examining how various criteria and approaches meet those goals. 
A. Goals and Considerations of Tribal Membership 
In designing membership criteria, there are many factors that a tribe might 
consider, based on the unique goals and circumstances of the tribe, to ensure its 
long-term strength and survival. 
 
1. Community Belonging 
Creating a strong sense of community is clearly an important element of 
tribal survival. Relying on blood quantum to determine membership can help 
facilitate the natural community that comes with kinship. Additionally, Professor 
Goldberg argues that enrollment criteria based on descent or blood are in-line with 
119 VERIFICATION OF INDIAN PREFERENCE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE 
INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, FORM BIA-4432 (expires Nov. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc015598.pdf.http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/pu
blic/documents/text/idc015598.pdf. Strangely, the change seems to make the preference less 
defensible from an equal protection challenge by a non-Indian, as it now extends to applicants who 
possess one-half degree Indian blood but have no tribal membership. Id. It did drop the blood 
quantum requirement for applicants who are members of federally recognized tribes, however. Id. 
120 Goldberg, supra note 19 at 437. 
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traditional means of determining membership in a tribe, since tribes have always 
used kinship as a primary marker of who belongs to the group.121. As a historical 
matter, this seems accurate, and is an interesting counterpoint to the common 
arguments that blood quantum should be discarded because of its “untraditional” 
origins.122 However, it seems like this was less the result of any conscious 
decision to use blood quantum to determine membership, and more a 
consequence of historical context. When people were less mobile and more 
isolated generally, their genealogical roots were less diverse. Community 
belonging, in the sense of mutual connection between an individual and the 
community, is generally considered to be less about distant genetic roots and 
more a sense of being born and raised in the same place, or otherwise having 
close ties and relationships. Blood quantum, conversely, focuses on the most 
distant genealogical roots possible, and ties membership to those roots. Different 
tribes have different conceptions of descent and for some bloodlines may be 
paramount in determining membership and role in society. For those tribes that do 
not have longstanding traditions of this sort, it may be useful to examine the role of 
blood quantum in shaping contemporary understandings of community belonging, 
and question whether blood quantum and the related values are the most useful to 
ensuring the strength and survival of the tribe. 
2. Maintaining Cultural Cohesion 
Cultural survival is one of the fundamental motivations of tribal 
governments. Without the attributes that make a tribe unique, it is essentially just a 
municipal government. In order to continue to exist as separate sovereigns, native 
nations must preserve their cultural sovereignty.123 A membership criterion that 
takes cultural affinity into account will help support tribal survival by causing the 
tribe to reflect on its cultural values, and by screening out those with weaker 
cultural ties. Professor Goldberg notes that one of the issues with loosening 
enrollment restrictions is the loss of cultural cohesion, and less of an emphasis on 
cultural strength as a political goal for tribal leaders.124 This framework assumes 
that individuals with less blood quantum will have weaker cultural ties. As a 
121 Id. at 459-61. 
122 Id. at 459 fn. 114 (2002) (citing authors that argue that blood quantum should be discarded for 
being a departure from pre-contact modes of determining membership). 
123 For a discussion of the importance of a focus on internal cultural sovereignty, see Coffey and 
Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future 
of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191 (2001). 
124 Goldberg, supra note 101, at 462-63. 
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general matter this is probably true, since lower blood quantum will mean more 
generations of marriage with people outside of the tribe, and logically, more 
influence from outside culture. On an individual basis, however, this is less true, 
and there are frequently cases where members with lower blood quantum or non-
members will be more engaged in the tribal community and culture than those with 
a higher blood quantum. Thus, it might seem intuitively appealing to base tribal 
enrollment on individual cultural connection, or proxies for that connection, such as 
residency. There are several problems with cultural connection to determine 
membership discussed below.125 
3. Maintaining Numbers 
Blood quantum requirements combined with intermarriage rates suggests 
that some tribes will see drastic reductions in tribal membership, and potentially 
extinguishment of the tribe.126 Loss of tribal identity is a serious problem, 
particularly for smaller tribes. As a result, in order to maintain tribal populations or 
existence, it may be necessary to adopt less stringent forms of enrollment criteria.  
4. Ensuring that future generations can remain tribal members 
It is likely painful for many tribal members to think that their children or 
grandchildren might not be able to be members of their tribe. Rates of 
intermarriage are high, and members might want to ensure that their descendants 
are allowed to keep their tribal identity.127 This is related to the issue of tribal 
survival just discussed.128 Balancing personal desires to continue Indian heritage 
with the goals of the tribe and the goal of creating objective, universal rules for 
membership will be a difficult but necessary task for tribal members. Some tribal 
members might favor loose restrictions that would allow their children to become 
members of the tribe, even if that level of restriction would not be good for the tribe 
as a whole. These individual preferences could determine the success of a 
constitutional reform effort, and should be carefully considered in designing 
membership criteria. 
125 Id. at 462-465; Section III.B.v, supra;  
126 Goldberg, supra, note 101 at 461(citing Russell Thornton, Tribal Membership Requirements and 
the Demography of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Native Americans, in Changing Numbers, Changing Needs: 
American Indian Demography and Public Health 103, 108-11 (Gary Sandefur et al. eds., 1996)). 
127 See Goldberg, supra note 101, at 466-67. 
128 Section III.A.iii, supra. 
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5. Increasing Political Power 
By increasing tribal enrollment, tribes could theoretically increase their 
political power at the state and federal levels by representing a larger voting bloc 
and being able to mobilize more people for certain political goals. The Cherokee 
are an example of this strategy in action.129 There are some problems with this 
plan, however. First, since Indians make up such a small percentage of the overall 
population, for many tribes, even expanding membership to include all lineal 
descendants would still not result in a very large voting bloc, relatively speaking. 
Second, the Department of the Interior has demonstrated hostility to expanding 
tribal membership,130 and expanding tribal membership may alienate the 
Department and make it harder to accomplish the tribe’s political goals. Third, 
tribes have become much more effective politically in recent years, regardless of 
their small numbers, by banding together in intertribal organizations. One tribe 
greatly expanding its own membership may be seen as more of a political threat 
by the other tribes, and would at least put more of a strain on the already 
overburdened federal benefits system, which could lead to less intertribal cohesion 
and less effective advocacy. Fourth, the federal government, with encouragement 
from state governments, might see this as a transparently political move, rather 
than a move based on tribal self-determination. Accordingly, the government may 
begin to see tribes less as independent sovereign entities and more as political 
clubs, not entitled to special recognition. This could invite another round of 
termination.131 
Opening up membership could have other political benefits beyond purely 
raising population numbers, however. As discussed earlier, tribes currently suffer 
from a “democratic deficit” in the sense that non-Indians can never have political 
voice in the tribe.132 In addition to the legal benefits discussed earlier, a thoughtful 
program of opening up enrollment could lead to an increase in perceived 
democratic accountability, and the federal government might be more open to 
increasing tribal jurisdiction as it did in the Violence Against Women Act 
amendments of 2013. Further expansions of tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction 
129 Goldberg, supra note 101, at 461. 
130 See Id. at 449. 
131 Cf. Id. at 449 (2002) (citing Thomas v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1192-93 (W.D. Wis. 
2001) (citing a 1992 letter from then Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs David 
Matheson which threatened termination by Congress or the courts if the tribe defined membership 
in such a way as to “‘self-determin[e]’ its sovereignty away.”)). 
132 See Section II.B, supra. 
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and increased sovereignty over reservations would be more politically palatable. 
The tribe would still have to be wary of several of the problems described above, 
but focusing on internal political participation rather than external political influence 
could alleviate some of the federal government’s potential concerns. 
6. Distributing benefits 
An important concern in designing membership rules is how membership 
changes will affect the distribution of tribal benefits like social services and per 
capita payments. In particular, Professor Goldberg notes that one hesitancy 
current tribal members might have with extending membership is that many of the 
current members or their ancestors endured hardships to remain with the tribe and 
keep the tribe alive.133 They may feel that whatever benefits they are receiving 
now are their reward for staying with the tribe, while others left to seek 
opportunities elsewhere or assimilate, and are now trying to return and claim the 
benefits for themselves.134 These are valid concerns, and there are no easy 
answers. However, relying solely on blood quantum might miss the point and 
include new arrivals with higher blood quantum while excluding some of those that 
have always been there, or their children. Additionally, trying to block newcomers 
from enrolling could lead to media or political problems.135 This is an important 
consideration, and one that will play an important role in the discussions of any 
tribe that seeks to change its membership requirements. 
7. Extending tribal jurisdiction 
A common goal for tribes is to consolidate control over their reservations 
and the people that live there, in order to better govern and ensure peace and 
safety. Tribes should consider their goal when designing membership criteria, as 
well-designed rules for enrollment can directly and indirectly increase tribal 
jurisdiction.136 
8. Internal and external perception 
Like other kinds of constitutional reform, changing or reevaluating existing 
membership requirements can change the way tribal members think about the 
133 Goldberg, supra note 101, at 465-66. 
134 Id. at 465-66. 
135 Id.  
136 Section II.B, supra. 
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purpose of the tribe and their relationship to it. A fair process of reform that reflects 
cultural values has the intrinsic value of increasing the legitimacy of the tribal 
government in the eyes of its members. Undertaking the reforms to bring 
membership criteria in line with traditional understandings could also give 
members a sense that the tribe is more in control of its own destiny. 
External perception is indirectly tied to the political influence discussion 
above, but applies even more broadly. Perception of a tribe as being more or less 
inclusive or more or less culturally cohesive can impact the way state and federal 
governments, as well as non-Indians behave with regards to the tribe. There are 
many misconceptions about tribes, and if tribes can seem like more legitimate 
governments that deserve sovereignty, they will be more likely to make political 
gains. Additionally, a greater respect for tribal sovereignty in a community might 
encourage individual non-members to respect tribal laws and decisions, even 
when the tribe lacks formal legal jurisdiction. 
B. Alternative requirements for tribal enrollment 
There are several common features in tribal citizenship rules, but they are 
not the exclusive possibilities. Tribes can go beyond these or use various forms 
and combinations of requirements in order to craft membership criteria that is 
appropriate to the specific tribe. The common requirements this paper will analyze 
include blood quantum, lineage requirements, and adoption procedures, as well as 
birthplace requirements as part of a broader residency analysis. Another common 
requirement is no dual citizenship,137 which seems like a secondary factor that will 
depend on the nature of the tribe and the tribe’s decision with regards to the other 
criteria and its relationships with other tribes. In addition to these common 
requirements, this section will look at cultural connection criteria. The next section 
will look at potential solutions to some of the tensions that emerge in designing 
membership criteria. 
1. Blood Quantum 
The advantages of a blood quantum requirement include the ease of 
application and the rough approximation of tribal cultural connection. However, as 
discussed above, blood quantum requirements emerged from unsettling federal 
137 Goldberg, supra note 101, at 467. 
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policies. They might also lead to dangerously exclusionary ways of thinking about 
membership, and risk extinguishing the tribe.  
There are two common forms of blood quantum requirements: those based 
on tribal ancestry and those based on Indian ancestry generally.138 Blood quantum 
is one of the simplest requirements to apply and does approximate the way 
membership worked pre-contact (when everyone was 100% Indian). It also limits 
membership to kin, and encourages people to marry and reproduce within the 
tribe, both of which may in turn encourage greater cultural participation. 
Additionally, people who have a higher percentage of Indian blood are more likely 
to look Indian, which could lead to greater affinity with their tribe and Indians 
generally.139 These requirements are also well-established for many tribes, having 
existed since at least 1934. There are a number of problems with using blood 
quantum criteria, however. The historical use of blood quantum, and the way it 
was incorporated by the federal government into tribal constitutions, makes its 
application suspect. As Professor Goldberg notes, “tradition” is not static, so 
discarding blood quantum solely for being “nontraditional” is somewhat antithetical 
to the idea that tribes are living cultures.140 However, the historical roots of blood 
quantum are dangerous, and taint their contemporary application.141 Just as blood 
quantum was used to divide up resources for tribal members, the continued use of 
blood quantum encourages tribal members to think of membership as a limited 
resource, like money, rather than as a cultural and governmental entity.142 Blood 
quantum rules encourage selfish exclusion instead of forward thinking inclusion. 
This is not true for all tribes, and those with a long historical tradition of defining 
membership this way should not feel compelled to change. Those tribes that only 
adopted these rules in 1934, however, should examine their culture and traditions 
and see if blood quantum is consistent and necessary to their perception of tribal 
138 Id. at 467. 
139 Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARVARD L. REV. 713 (1985) (arguing that 
being a member of a recognizable and insular group could create solidarity and improve political 
power). 
140 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 459.  
141 See Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 277, 301-02 (1993). 
142 Id at 305. Disenrollments are some of the most salient examples of this perspective on tribal 
membership. While a tribe may have legitimate reasons to disenroll members, many of the 
disenrollment decisions seem to be linked to cutting membership numbers to increase benefits for 
the remaining members. This version of events has also been picked up by the media and 
contributes to negative external perceptions of tribes. See, e.g., James Dao, In California Indian 
Tribes With Casino Money Cast Off Members, N.Y. TIMES, December 13, 2011, at A20. 
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belonging. This is not to say that race can have no legitimate role in determining 
membership, just that using it as the sole criterion often fails to capture elements 
that are likely more important to long term tribal survival. Additionally, as 
mentioned above, a strict blood quantum combined with high rates of 
intermarriage between Indians and non-Indians could lead to the extinction of the 
tribe. 
2. Lineal Descent 
Lineal descent rules also capture many of the benefits of blood quantum 
requirements, such as kinship and ease of application, but risk weaker cultural 
connections and the perception of the tribe solely as a financial resource. Like 
blood quantum, there are multiple forms of lineal descent rules that tribes use 
today.143 Some tribes require enrollment of a single parent, some require a 
specific parent to be enrolled, some require both parents to be enrolled, and some 
just require the enrollment of an ancestor on a particular roll compiled by the 
federal government. The latter category in particular is a very loose requirement 
and employed by some of the largest tribes today.144 As mentioned above, these 
looser rules have led to greater external political clout for these tribes by 
increasing membership. There will also be a lesser chance of the tribe eventually 
running out of members through intermarriage, unless the rule is that both parents 
must be members. A disadvantage of lineal descent is that it could lead to a 
greater percentage of the population having weak ties to the reservation and the 
tribe. Logically, the greater the geographic dispersion of tribal members, the 
greater the likelihood that tribal laws and expenditures will reflect individual 
interests rather than tribal interests. People living off the reservation will be more 
inclined to vote for per capita distribution of funds than investment in tribal 
infrastructure, for instance. Once again, this leads to a view of the tribe as a piggy 
bank, which is almost certainly not conducive to the long term survival of the tribe. 
Another problem is that descent rules alone fail to create any kind of necessary tie 
to the tribe other than applying for and receiving membership. Under blood 
quantum rules, members are encouraged to marry other members, and therefore 
spend time near the reservation interacting with other tribal members. This 
investment can encourage members to be more tribally minded. Under loose lineal 
descent rules, however, there is no such incentive. 
143 See supra note 19, at 467.  
144 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, July 9, 1983, art. II; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
CHEROKEE NATION, 1999, art. IV. 
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A problem shared by blood quantum and lineal descent rules are the 
negative reaction various outsiders have to race based rules for membership. The 
Supreme Court’s race-blind equal protection jurisprudence, for instance, 
demonstrates a level of hostility to differential treatment of groups based on 
race.145 Additionally, many people are concerned with special treatment of Indians, 
and do not like that they receive special rights.146 These considerations counsel 
against the use of race as the sole criteria for tribal membership. 
3. Residency 
Using residency on or near the tribal land as a membership requirement 
helps ensure a cultural connection, as well as encouraging members to think 
about the reservation as a whole rather than focusing on their separate individual 
desires. Even if members are voting entirely in self-interest, if they live on the 
reservation it is more likely to be in their interest to choose investment in 
infrastructure over per capita distribution of funds. There are shortcomings to a 
strict residency requirement, however. As Professor Goldberg notes, residency 
requirements could prevent people from leaving for legitimate tribal reasons, 
especially if they would lose membership or rights while absent from the 
reservation.147 In addition, tribal governments as landowners have the power to 
control who resides on the reservation,148 which could lead to exclusions of certain 
people based on illegitimate political reasons. Additionally, people who live just 
outside of the reservation might be just as interested in cultural affairs as those on 
the reservation, but would be excluded by a rule that requires residency within the 
reservation boundaries. These concerns could be dealt with by carefully 
constructed rules based on the individual circumstances of each tribe, but the line-
drawing issues they present may make strict residency requirements untenable, 
as people might be unable to agree on how to implement them. 
Birthplace requirements are a subset of residency requirements. Like other 
residency requirements, they attempt to capture the value of having people remain 
145 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013). 
146 See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-
Wisconsin, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Wis. 1992). See also, Terri Hanson, Anti-Indian CERA 
Doesn’t Like the Law of the Land in United States, or Us, Apparently, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK, March 28, 2011, available at, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/03/28/anti-indian-group-works-undermine-
sovereignty-least-15-states-154225 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
147 See supra note 19, at 464. 
148 Id. 
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near the reservation. Instead of being aimed at the individual member, however, 
they are aimed at the parents, who will be incentivized to live near the reservation, 
or at least go to the reservation for the child’s birth. If the requirement is that the 
parents be domiciled on the reservation, there is the potential advantage that the 
child will be more likely to be raised on the reservation and with the tribal culture, 
but there is also no guarantee that the child will maintain that connection later in 
life. 
4. Adoption 
Several tribes have adoption or naturalization procedures for non-members 
to become members of the tribe, but the requirements for adoption vary from tribe 
to tribe. Professor Goldberg lists several varieties of requirements.149 Some tribes 
seem to have no Indian blood requirement, at least in the constitution,150 while 
others do.151 Some tribes also have additional requirements in order to be 
adopted, such as residency152 or spousal connection.153 Adoption procedures 
have the advantage of being flexible and taking the most information into account, 
but a reliance solely on adoption proceedings to fix other errors in the system is 
unwise. These proceedings will likely have a great deal of discretion built in,154 
which could be abused to exclude personal or political enemies of the person or 
persons in charge of deciding adoptions. If appeals of adoption decisions are used 
to combat these potential errors, it could greatly increase the burden on tribal 
courts or administrative bodies. 
5. Cultural connection 
Complications in measuring and evaluating “cultural connection” could 
make it difficult to agree on a standard for determining membership. Residency, 
discussed above, is often used as a kind of proxy for cultural connection, but there 
are other ways of testing an individual’s ties to the community. Other factors 
149 See supra note 19, at 463 n.132.  
150 CONSTITUTION OF THE NEZ PERCE TRIBE, Art. IV, § 2. 
151 CONSTITUTION OF THE YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION, 1947, Art. II, § 2. 
152 CONSTITUTION OF THE LOWER BRULE SIOUX TRIBE, 1986, Art. II, § 2. 
153 CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT MCDERMITT PAIUTE AND SHOSHONE TRIBE, 1936, Art. II, § 2(b). 
154 The Constitution of the Yavapai-Apache Nation, for instance, says that the Tribal Council will 
have sole discretion in adopting new members, except for spouses and adopted children of tribal 
members, in which case the decision can be overturned if it is arbitrary and 
capricious. CONSTITUTION OF THE YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION, 1947, Art. II, §2(b)-(c). Additionally, 
tribes might be reluctant to remove discretion from these decisions, because it would allow non-
members to basically force the tribe to accept them, which might  not sit well with tribal members. 
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include: language fluency, community service, elders’ certification, and ceremonial 
participation.155 There could also be a civics test, ala the United States 
naturalization process,156 which could test familiarity with tribal culture, history, and 
laws. Any combination of these factors could be used, based on the circumstances 
of the tribe, and it could take the form of a test or cultural knowledge, or a checklist 
of requirements, or both. Using cultural criteria has the benefits of ensuring the 
tribal members are knowledgeable about the tribe, and the investment of learning 
about the tribe could inspire them to be more civic minded. Additionally, it has the 
obvious advantage of helping to preserve tribal culture and language against 
external influences. However, there are a number of potential issues with using 
cultural affiliation as the test for citizenship. 
Like adoption, the question of who will administer a cultural test and the 
possible appeals process for that test are difficult to resolve, and a tribe wishing to 
implement a test will have to consider administrative costs against the costs of 
wrongfully excluding people from the tribe. Furthermore, designing these tests 
could be controversial, as culture and tradition are not static, and different tribal 
members might have different ideas about what it means to be a member of a 
given tribe. These are not insurmountable obstacles, but they may delay or disrupt 
the process of membership reform. 
One issue that Professor Goldberg notes is that the criteria that could be 
used as proxies for cultural connection, e.g. residency, language fluency, are 
“unnervingly” similar to the criteria set forth in the controversial “existing Indian 
family” test some courts have used in applying the Indian Child Welfare Act.157 
Courts applying the “existing Indian family” test look at various factors to determine 
whether a child is “Indian enough” to trigger ICWA provisions, contrary to the 
language of the statute and congressional intent.158 The test is applied in a 
substantial minority of states, and the Supreme Court avoided ruling on the 
doctrine in its recent ICWA case.159 “Existing Indian family” doctrine devalues the 
155 See supra note 19, at 463.  
156 Civics (History and Government) Questions for the Naturalization Test, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, (2011), 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of%20Citizenship/Citizenship%20Resourc
e%20Center%20Site/Publications/100q.pdf. 
 
157 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 463.  
158 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 11.07. 
159 Id. (Listing Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee, as states that apply the test; 
and Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New 
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opinion of the tribe as to the Indian status of the child, and usurps tribal and 
federal authority for state authority. Hesitancy to employ a test that resembles the 
“existing Indian family” test is therefore understandable. However, as Professor 
Goldberg notes, “what seems presumptuous when undertaken by state courts may 
be less troubling when the deciding authority is a tribal enrollment board.”160 
Additionally, developing their own culturally tailored requirements would allow 
tribes to set authoritative criteria for their own tribes, rather than leaving it to state 
courts to decide. Lack of federal action161 means that many states will continue to 
employ the doctrine and tribes having clearly developed their own criteria may 
encourage state courts to defer to tribal judgments based on those criteria. 
Perhaps more importantly, even if the requirements are not ultimately used for 
enrollment purposes, the development of culturally-based criteria could help in 
these cases, and could help a tribe define its cultural goals. 
Deciding who would be allowed to prove their cultural connection is another 
potential difficulty, as some tribes might be inundated with potential members 
trying to get a share of the gaming revenues.162 Professor Goldberg also notes 
that applying an expedited version of the test to those with family ties, or giving 
them special treatment on the test, would bring race back into the equation, which 
some scholars oppose.163 These challenges seem to counsel more for adopting 
thoughtful, nuanced rules, rather than for rejecting cultural connection criteria 
completely. Requiring recommendations from elders, or residency, for instance, 
would prevent a large number of false applicants, as would a system that delays or 
denies per capita payments to members who join this way, which will be discussed 
more later in this paper. Additionally, while some critics might oppose the use of 
race at all in determining tribal membership, giving preferential treatment to 
biological Indians would make sense, as they would be presumptively more likely 
to have cultural affiliation that might not be captured by whatever cultural 
connection test is employed. Giving preference to those with tribal blood while 
keeping some form of membership open to a broader population would seem to 
capture many of the legal benefits discussed in Section II. 
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington as states that have rejected 
the test). See also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013). 
160 See Goldberg, supra note 19 at 463.  
161 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 11.07 (citing accounts of failed legislation to either 
affirm or reject the doctrine). See also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
162 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 463.  
163 Id. at 463-634. 
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Another problem discussed by Professor Goldberg is the possibility of 
disenrollments based on lack of cultural connection, or lack of such connection for 
a period of time, or a generational gap.164 Furthermore, some tribes believe that 
one cannot lose connection to their tribe, because they are born with it and that 
connection stays with them even after death.165 Both of these concerns are better 
left to the tribes on an individual basis, and do not counsel against tribes adopting 
cultural criteria based on their own traditions. To reiterate, the paramount concern 
in defining membership criteria for tribes is the tradition and culture of the 
individual tribe. Each tribe must arrive at its own decisions about what it means to 
be a member. Ultimately, incorporating some sort of cultural connection test is a 
good strategy for tribes to help maintain cultural survival, and encourage more 
participation in cultural activities. 
C. Solutions to Design Problems 
In order to resolve some of the tensions that were discussed above, tribes 
can combine existing requirements, or create new criteria that balances traditional 
goals with modern circumstances. There are several potential solutions including: 
separate voting districts for off-reservation and on-reservation members, a “right-
of-return” for off-reservation individuals, and severing benefits from tribal 
enrollment.166 Professor Goldberg mentions that some of the criteria might have 
the effect of creating “multiple categories of citizenship,”167 which as a general 
principle merits further discussion.  Professor Goldberg also mentions expanding 
adoption procedures, 168 which is discussed above. 
1. Separate voting rights for off-reservation and on-reservation 
members 
Separate voting districts can allow non-residents of the reservation to 
maintain their connection with the tribe, while keeping most of the tribal control in 
the hands of reservation residents. An example is a recent Cherokee constitutional 
convention, where the draft constitution has now been adopted as the Cherokee 
164 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 464. (Disenrollments are already a problem for some tribes 
under existing blood quantum requirements, as discussed above). 
165 Id. 
166 See Id. at 467-471. 
167 See Id. at 467. 
168 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 470-71. 
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Constitution.169 Under the Cherokee Constitution, 15 of the 17 legislative seats are 
apportioned for Cherokees residing in Oklahoma, while the remaining two seats 
are elected by non-residents,170 who comprise about 40% of the Cherokee 
population.171 This measure helps ensure that the legislature is focused internally 
on developing the tribe and its infrastructure, while giving a voice to the non-
resident Cherokee and helping maintain their connection to the tribe. This is an 
elegant solution for the Cherokee, but it may not work for all tribes. For some, non-
resident members may feel that their voices are just as important as those on the 
reservation, and they should not be allocated such a small proportion of the votes. 
At the same time, residents may feel that only those who are willing to maintain 
close ties to the tribe should be allowed to participate in tribal government. 
Additionally, this approach fails to capture the benefits of residency requirements 
that strongly incentivize interaction with the tribe and the potential that has for 
investment in tribal culture and development. However, it is probably better than 
no residency requirement in terms of cultural preservation, and provides a degree 
of flexibility for tribal members who might leave for legitimate reasons. Tribes that 
are interested in this kind of tier voting system should also consider how much 
weight to give non-resident voters for referendums, or constitutional amendments 
that require popular vote. 
2. “Right-of-return” 
Under a reactivation system, it seems like those living off the reservation 
would lose their normal citizenship in the tribe, but retain the right to reactive it 
easily when they returned, and if they met certain criteria.172 Like off-reservation 
voting, this might help maintain ties to the tribe, although it could lead to confusion 
and alienate people who leave the reservation for college. It seems like a better 
solution might be to consider them members in most regards but remove or restrict 
their ability to vote. 
3. Severing benefits from tribal enrollment 
Separating tribal enrollment from the automatic receipt of benefits can help 
ensure that members choose to identify with the tribe for more legitimate purposes 
than monetary reward, and encourage a focus on tribal development and 
169 See Id. at 468; CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1999, art. VI § 3. 
170 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1999, art. VI § 3. 
171 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 468. 
172 See id. at 469.  
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investment. Professor Goldberg discusses a system where tribal enrollment is not 
necessary to receive tribal benefits. Core tribal decisions can be made by those 
with the strongest cultural connection, while a broader class can receive benefits, 
i.e. the children of tribal members who do not qualify for membership.173 Goldberg 
notes however, that this might only extend to tribal benefits, and that the federal 
government might not provide services to those who are not members of the 
tribe.174 One solution Goldberg suggests is to call everyone tribal members, but 
only allow some to vote.175 This could have a negative effect, however, if the 
federal government decides it only wants to provide services to traditional tribal 
members, it might stop deferring to tribal definitions of membership and adopt 
criteria to decide who is Indian enough to receive benefits. Government 
intervention is a potential threat with any system that divides up rights based on 
tiered citizenship, but it is particularly acute when benefits are being provided 
without the right to vote, as it might be seen as an attempt to game the federal 
system. 
Another possibility is the inverse system, where certain members are 
allowed to vote but not partake in certain benefits. Some tribes already have a 
form of this, such as the Colville Confederated Tribes, which allows only 
descendants of certain constituent tribes to hunt or fish in certain areas.176 It could 
be hard to maintain an inverse system, since the voters might just vote to include 
themselves as beneficiaries, but incorporating the requirement into the 
constitution, or requiring a 2/3 vote or some similar provision, could possibly 
alleviate this problem, depending on tribal demographics. Expanding voting rights 
has several potential advantages. If voting was universal but per capita payments 
were conditioned on tribal residency, for example, non-reservation voters would 
have no personal incentive to vote for per capita payments, and on reservation 
votes would have to choose between two options that both benefit them. This 
would make tribes more likely to invest in important infrastructure, while keeping 
the decision somewhat democratic and legitimate. Another possibility would be to 
limit per capita payments to members with sufficient blood quantum, while 
extending voting rights to others who joined through a cultural test. This would 
discourage people from attempting to join a tribe just to receive monetary 
173 Id. at 469-70.  
174 Id. at 470. 
175 Id. at 470. 
176 Icicle Creek Fishery Opening, resolution 2014-250, 2014 Colville Ps’quosa Spring Chinook 
Fishing Regulations (2014),  
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payments, which is a concern when loosening membership requirements.177 Since 
voting membership would still be open to non-Indians, however, this scheme 
would solve the “democratic deficit” problem and allow tribes to exercise greater 
jurisdiction, even over those who choose not to become members. Finally, this 
type of system would attract non-members with an actual interest in the tribal 
cultural and governance, and allow those who have maintained certain ties but 
insufficient blood quantum to maintain their tribal identity. 
4. Tier levels of citizenship 
The examples discussed above each involve giving different membership 
rights to different individuals, based on a variety of factors. Thinking about 
membership and tribal enrollment in terms of degrees of rights, as opposed to an 
on/off switch where an individual is either in or out, can lead to much more 
nuanced citizenship laws that capture many of the benefits with fewer of the costs. 
The two main disadvantages of a tiered system are the possibility that the federal 
government might decide to limit federal benefits to members that fit certain 
criteria, and that the system might end up being overly complex. If the membership 
system is too complicated it could seem overly legalistic and lose its cultural 
character, and members might start to think of themselves as belonging to a 
category of beneficiaries, rather than as members of a tribe. As long as tribes are 
conscious of this potential problem, however, they should be able to avoid it, by 
tying and framing the requirements to the traditions and goals of the tribe. 
Some tribes already have different levels of membership rights that vary 
according to different membership criteria. The Choctaw Tribe of Oklahoma, for 
instance, allows voting by all lineal descendants of people who were on the Dawes 
Rolls, but only allows members with at least ¼ blood quantum to hold the positions 
of Chief, Assistant Chief, or Tribal Council Member.178 Residency is also a 
common requirement for holding office, although this is more often thought of in 
terms of geographic representation rather than as an indication that the candidate 
will be more culturally connected.179 
These establish precedent for tiered levels of membership rights, according 
to proxies for cultural affiliation. The same theory could be extended to benefits, 
177 See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 462-63.  
178 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, July 9, 1983, art. II.  
179 See, e.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE, 8-3-60 (1979). 
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such as per capita payments, which should ease some of the concerns with 
expanding tribal membership. Federal Regulations require that tribes seeking to 
distribute per capita payments to a subset of the population must justify their 
decision and show that it is “reasonable and not arbitrary” and that it does not 
violate the Indian Civil Rights Act.180 The Indian Civil Rights Act contains a 
guarantee of equal protection, like the 14th Amendment,181 which means that the 
tribe might have to justify its action according to a similar standard, i.e. the strict 
scrutiny standard that is normally applied to race-based classifications.182 
However, there are several answers to the protection concern. First, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) has generally left enforcement of ICRA provisions to tribal 
courts, rather than getting directly involved,183 which is in-line with congressional 
policy as explained in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.184 Accordingly, the BIA 
might be willing to defer to tribal judgments regarding the validity of such a plan, 
particularly since it is tied to tribal membership determinations which are firmly in 
the realm of the tribe’s sovereignty.185 Second, blood quantum has been used to 
draw lines in federal and tribal law for a long time, and might be treated as a 
special case that does not trigger strict scrutiny analysis.186 Third, even if the 
determination is subject to strict scrutiny, it does serve a compelling government 
interest, as discussed above, and the potential infeasibility of finding other ways to 
deter newcomers who are only interested in per capita payments might mean that 
the classification is sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. 
Essentially, if full strict scrutiny is applied, the burden would be on the tribe to 
demonstrate that “available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice,”187 
which is generally a very high bar, but not necessarily insurmountable. 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper had three goals. The first was to explore what legal road-blocks, 
if any, would prevent tribes from enrolling non-Indians as members. It appears that 
tribes would have the power to begin enrolling non-Indians, without any further 
action needed from Congress. The second was to highlight and begin a 
180 25 C.F.R. § 290.14 (2001). 
181 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2010) (ICRA). 
182 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. 
Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
183 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 14.04[2]. 
184 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
185 Id.  
186 Krakoff, supra note 75. (Arguing that all use of Indian race has some political aspect). 
187 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
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conversation about some of the legal implications of expanding tribal membership 
criteria. In particular, the potential that expanded criteria would have for bringing 
tribes closer to a pre-Oliphant level of tribal criminal jurisdiction. The final goal was 
to expand on the discussion of the policy implications that tribal membership 
decisions would have for tribes, and look at ways to reconcile competing 
objectives. By combining different membership requirements, and tying certain 
benefits and rights to certain criteria, tribes can achieve a more flexible, nuanced 
approach to tribal membership that more closely reflects the goals of the specific 
tribe. As discussed above, tribes that seek to redefine their membership rules 
must focus on their own culture and traditions. However, there are many legal and 
political consequences that would emerge from changing enrollment criteria, 
thoughtful constitutional reform should take those implications into account. 
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